El cable analiza la cumbre de la Unasur, que no terminó con una condena conjunta a la presencia militar estadounidense en Colombia. Los diplomáticos vieron con buenos ojos  la actuación de los mandatarios Inácio Lula Da Silva, de Brasil, y Cristina Fernández, de Argentina, para calmar los caldeados ánimos de Chávez y Correa que calificaban esta presencia y el Acuerdo como una “provocación”.

id:
 220492
date: 
8/12/2009 16:15
refid:
 09QUITO715
origin:
 Embassy Quito
classification: 
CONFIDENTIAL
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 09QUITO703
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C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000715 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS 
TAGS: PREL, AORC, ECIN, MARR, EC, CO, XM, XR 
SUBJECT: UNASUR SUMMIT: NO CONSENSUS ON U.S.-COLOMBIAN DCA 
 
REF: QUITO 703 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d) 
 
1.  (C) SUMMARY:  Several presidents from the region 
condemned the U.S.-Colombia Defense Cooperation Agreement at 
the ceremony where President Bachelet transferred the 
rotating presidency of UNASUR to President Correa (reftel). 
Presidents Chavez and Correa claimed that U.S. military 
presence at Colombian bases constituted a "provocation." 
President Lula and Fernandez calmed the discussion -- Lula 
calling for a UNASUR meeting with President Obama and another 
with Colombia at the table, and Fernandez offering to host a 
meeting of UNASUR presidents on the subject in Buenos Aires. 
The Declaration of Quito by UNASUR ministers did not include 
text condemning U.S. military presence in Colombia, but did 
call for an immediate ministerial meeting, scheduled for 
August 24 in Quito.  END SUMMARY. 
 
CHAVEZ SETS THE TONE 
 
2.  (C) Following the signing of the Declaration of Quito 
transferring the rotating Union of South American Nations 
(UNASUR) presidency to Ecuador, and initial remarks by 
Bachelet and Correa, presidents from the region expressed 
their disapproval or unease over plans for the U.S.-Colombia 
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA).  Venezuelan President 
Hugo Chavez started the discussion referring to his "moral 
obligation" to call attention to Colombia's decision to allow 
the "installation of U.S. bases in Colombian territory." 
Chavez asserted that Venezuela felt threatened, calling the 
March 1, 2008, Colombian bombing of a FARC camp in Ecuadorian 
territory a precursor (to future Colombian action) and 
complaining that Colombia justified its extraterritorial 
attack as a preemptive strike.  He claimed that statements by 
the Israeli Foreign Minister to certain UNASUR countries that 
Venezuela supported Hezbollah was part of this "provocation." 
 He warned that the "winds of war had begun to blow" and that 
this was the beginning of a "tragedy" in the region. 
 
3.  (C) President Correa concurred with Chavez' remarks, 
saying that the decision to allow the presence of U.S. bases 
in Colombia "could destabilize the region."  He argued that 
Ecuador was the country most affected because it had 
"suffered seven years of fumigations, bombings, and displaced 
persons" as a result of Colombia's "civil war."  Increasingly 
agitated, Correa said that Ecuador's neighbor to the north 
had problems with guerrillas, "narco-politics," 
"para-politics," narcotrafficking, and drug cultivation.  He 
continued that "in addition to this, putting foreign military 
bases in Colombia is not only a danger to the region, but 
also a provocation."  Correa called for a meeting of UNASUR 
members to discuss the issue. 
 
CALL FOR A PRESIDENTIAL MEETING 
 
4.  (C) Following the harsh words by Chavez and Correa, 
Brazilian President Lula da Silva defused somewhat the tense 
atmosphere by suggesting that UNASUR conduct a dialogue on 
the issue that would include all those concerned.  He 
proposed that UNASUR invite the USG to an "in-depth 
discussion" regarding its relations with the region.  Looking 
to Correa, he added, "Remember that meeting in Trinidad and 
Tobago, (when President Barack) Obama requested a meeting 
with UNASUR, and wasn't it a beautiful meeting?"  Lula 
explained that a meeting of UNASUR presidents could determine 
the correct position on the issue.  Lula also suggested that 
it would be very important to hear the views of Colombian 
Foreign Minister Jaime Bermudez and Defense Minister Santos 
regarding a U.S. presence in Colombia, saying that "this will 
only be resolved with dialogue and debate, speaking the 
truth; and people will have to hear things they don't like... 
 We need to agree on the future of UNASUR." 
 
5.  (C) Argentine President Cristina Fernandez echoed the 
call for a presidential meeting, saying that the defense 
ministers would not be able to resolve the issue.  She added 
that the "problem is not military...rather political...and 
only the presidents can resolve it."  She suggested that such 
a meeting be held in a location that would not have any 
perception of hostility, such as (exists) in Ecuador or 
Venezuela, to avoid any excuses."  Correa interjected that 
the meeting should be held in Buenos Aires, which Fernandez 
agreed to. 
 
COLOMBIA FIGHTS BACK 
 
6.  (SBU) Uribe did not attend the UNASUR meeting or 
President Correa's inauguration; Colombia was represented by 
its Vice Foreign Minister Clemencia Forero.  At the meeting, 
Forero clarified for those present at the UNASUR meeting that 
the military bases in dispute were Colombian.  She asserted 
that Colombia had no intention of allowing the U.S. to 
establish military bases in Colombia, nor had the U.S. any 
intention of doing so.  She suggested that any future meeting 
of UNASUR to discuss the issue include a dialogue on all the 
other military agreements of member countries within the 
region, as well as the autonomy of each country's decisions. 
(Note: Due to difficulties with his plane, Garcia arrived 
late, attending only the luncheon offered by President 
Correa.  End Note.) 
 
NO FORMAL CONDEMNATION 
 
7.  (U) The resulting text of the UNASUR meeting, the 
Declaration of Quito, did not include a condemnation of U.S. 
military presence in Colombia, but did require that the 
UNASUR ministers of foreign affairs and defense meet within a 
month; the meeting is planned for August 24 in Quito.  An MFA 
official bulletin detailed the primary accords of the text: 
approval of the Declaration of the Heads of State of UNASUR; 
creation of three South American Councils:  1) Infrastructure 
and Planning, 2) Education, Culture, Science, Technology and 
Innovation, and 3) Social Development; and approval of a 
statement on the Falkland Islands.  The Declaration also 
called for the formation within 120 days of an Investment 
Working Group that would evaluate the possibility of an 
advisory center for disputes between governments and 
investors. 
 
COMMENT 
 
8.  (C) While the GOE's rhetoric on the U.S.-Colombia DCA had 
been more restrained than Venezuela's, President Correa 
followed Chavez' lead in harshly denouncing it at the UNASUR 
meeting.  Correa reiterated much of the same rhetoric from 
the UNASUR meeting in his inauguration speech and appearance 
before the Ecuadorian public at a local stadium later the 
same day.  Lula's suggestion of a UNASUR meeting with 
President Obama was not answered by the rest of the UNASUR 
participants in the meeting.  Misperceptions and political 
agendas appear to have driven much of the commentary by the 
press and the region's more leftist leaders on this issue. 
While those with political motives will likely continue 
attacking Colombia and the U.S., a unified and persistent USG 
message, as well as continued one-on-one engagement, could 
help resolve misperceptions by the GOE and the press. 
 
HODGES 
 
=======================CABLE ENDS============================